You’ll notice we’ve been kind of quiet at The Long Snapper the last month or so. That’s because there’s been next to nothing happening, and frankly, there are other sports around. So while we’ve been watching the cycling, football, cricket, or…whatever sport Roughing the Passer follows when he takes a break from watching Eric Ebron drop passes, the NFL’s been quietly getting on with its business, disturbing no-one.
If only. As you might have either noticed or guessed, the NFL never really shuts down. Still, you won’t be hearing too much from us over the summer unless we think of something to write about. Not much point in moaning about the saturation of coverage then contributing to it without having anything you really want to say, eh?
So what has been happening? Follow-up to the draft, mainly. There were a few shocks and stories on draft night, but it mostly veered towards “slightly unexpected”, rather than the “lay off the mushrooms” department, unless you’re Chip Kelly trading back into the first-round for a mid-round guard prospect. That said, I did find the Cowboys drafting Ezekiel Elliott at fourth overall pretty interesting.
See, I never thought the Cowboys would go running back, and I didn’t have Elliott pegged as an early pick. Now, I don’t know that much about the NFL in the grand scheme of things, but for the most part those more in the know weren’t suggesting so either.
So Why Is This Interesting?
Yeah, so far, so mildly diverting but that’s it, right? Well, it was Mike Carlson’s piece for NFL UK that made me think a bit more deeply about this. The interest is essentially because Elliott’s a running back, and all that means. We know Elliott was one of the top players in the draft, ignoring positional weighting, but we know that running back is one of the most devalued positions in the league, where it’s seen as relatively easy to get a serviceable player, and not a huge amount to be gained unless you’re getting a totally elite back.
It gets a bit more curious, too. The rookie wage scale tends to be a suppressive force, whereby players earn less than they probably would on the open market, should they hit their potential. Getting a rookie who plays to a decent level in their first year, and keeps it up for their next four, is an absolute bargain, where you’ll be investing a smaller percentage of your total salary cap in someone who provides a higher percentage of important play to your team. For example, first overall pick Jared Goff places 26th across the league in average wage per year for quarterback contracts. Ezekiel Elliott is 9th among running backs. Top ten money! And that’s at a position where you can get more than one well-paid player, unlikely at quarterback (unless you’re Philadelphia).
Why Did They Pick Him, Then?
Two years ago, Dallas had DeMarco Murray, who led the league in rushing, and in total yards from scrimmage. So, he ran a lot, and he caught a whole heap of passes. Murray racked up 2,261 yards in 2014, then took his money, went to Philadelphia, and bombed. In his place, Dallas eventually settled on Darren McFadden, who got 1,417 yards in what roughly amounted to 13-14 games after he won the job from Joseph Randle. Respectable numbers! But with Tony Romo and Dez Bryant out injured (and their replacements doing much worse than McFadden), Dallas went from three very good starters at QB, RB and WR, to an okay one and two bums.
Elliott is seen as representing the DeMarco Murray style of player. He’s a ‘three-down’ back, which means that as well as running the ball, he’s a realistic prospect to throw the ball to, and he can also pass block, helping to buy Tony Romo an extra second or two. Murray did that. McFadden and Randle? Not so much. The benefit of having a three-down back who’s a top runner is that defences have to prepare for more eventualities. If your third-down running back isn’t much of a runner, they don’t have to commit the same resources to potentially stopping them, so you free up a defensive player to cover the pass. Similarly, if they’re not much of a pass blocker, you have a better chance to get to the quarterback. Can’t catch? Don’t worry too much about having covering them out of the backfield.
So that’s the value of a three-down back, but that just explains why he’s the a highly -picked running back. That he’s very good at all three explains why he went in say, the first 16 picks, not why he went as high as 4th overall. The thing is that Dallas have invested huge amounts of resources in their offensive line. They have three first-round picks (Tyron Smith, Travis Frederick, Zack Martin), a youngster on a comparatively big deal (La’el Collins), and a couple of veterans on not that small deals (Ronald Leary, Doug Free). It’d be a bit pointless having that much invested in top run-blockers and then throwing the ball to your first read every down. The value of a three-down back reflects the general value of having a great running game. The difference between a good one and a great one? Teams were generally okay letting McFadden rack up a few yards whilst committing resources elsewhere, because they thought (often correctly) that he wouldn’t get sufficient yards to actually put the game in jeopardy, or to give Dallas momentum.
If you’ve spent all that money on an offensive line and it’s not helping you win games, it’s wasted. And if it takes the best running back to do that, so be it. McFadden might have been one of the leading rushers in the NFL last year, but that wasn’t enough. Dallas have the best offensive line in the league, they ought to have the best rushing attack every year, right?
So What’s The Problem?
Sounds simple, doesn’t it? The issue comes back to opportunity cost. A running back is always going to seem like a luxury pick, because there is the perception of so many more late-round picks or undrafted free agents doing wonders in the NFL. There is recent precedent for that perception – undrafted Arian Foster led the league in rushing in 2010, his second season in the league. Two years ago, Baltimore plucked Justin Forsett from essentially nowhere and he topped 1,250 yards. Conversely, the last highly-drafted running back was Trent Richardson, who has been an epic, epic bust. Could Dallas have not done better drafting someone who might turn into a three-down back, like Devontae Booker (4th round, Denver) or Paul Perkins (5th round, NY Giants)? Well, it would’ve been more of a risk, obviously.
Dallas’ defense is dreadful. In their pass-rush, maybe they would’ve drafted Joey Bosa if he were there, but he wasn’t. In the secondary, Jalen Ramsey was, so why not pick him? Personally, I think Ramsey is the better player, but a quick look at last year’s draft through the retrospectoscope makes that less likely: Dallas drafted Byron Jones, a sort of similar safety/cornerback hybrid (albeit a touch more in the Devon McCourty mould) last year. They’d have two identical players, one of whom would be spending the majority of his rookie contract at a less-than-ideal position. Is that also a waste of resources?
If, as it looks, there was no-one who fit in Dallas’ defensive scheme with the talent of a #4 pick there, why not trade the pick? Get the value of a fourth overall pick in other picks added together (say, a mid-first rounder and a second or third rounder). Well, that requires someone wanting to trade up. And to #4. While Tennessee ended up trading back to 8, trading up to 4 would’ve cost someone a lot, in terms of the depth they could add. Wisely, it looks as if no-one wanted to give up that much.
Sum It Up Then
I was going to rag on this pick before I started writing this piece, and I still think it looks suboptimal. That said, I’ve come round to the idea of this pick. Who else was picked early? In terms of who was available, we’ve discarded Ramsey as above. Who was next? Buckner? Not a fit in Dallas’ defense. Ronnie Stanley? Jack Conklin? Yeah, Dallas don’t need another lineman. Look at Leonard Floyd at #9 – he’s more of a 3-4 linebacker, and Dallas play a 4-3. So then you get to the second tier of cornerbacks! I don’t think that would’ve been a bad choice, but it’d be a toss-up between a generational talent at a slightly less valued position versus merely a very good talent at a more highly valued position.
Dallas were left in a weird position. Despite the opportunity cost, despite what they were (and are) giving up in terms of a high draft pick and paying top-10 wages for a running back, it’s a bizarrely safe choice. It’s a player they reckon is going to fit the system, who they can be fairly sure is going to be a success, and who is going to help make the most of what they’ve already invested.
The Long Snapper 